The Nature of Piety Theme Analysis

The Euthyphro, like Plato’s other early dialogues, contains a failed attempt to successfully define a concept (such as justice or virtue) by way of a discussion between Socrates and another character. In this case, Euthyphro—a presumed local expert on all things righteous—discusses the nature of “piety” at length with Socrates on the steps of the Athenian magistrates court. Both men are at the courthouse to address impiety: Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for causing the death of a murderous slave, whilst Socrates is being charged with spreading ideas that are irreverent towards the gods. Socrates suggests, with typical irony, that he is ignorant on such matters and might perhaps learn a thing or two from Euthyphro on the subject. The joke on Euthyphro, however as he ends up being schooled by Socrates. Throughout their conversation, Euthyphro offers five possible definitions for piety, which Socrates questions and undermines in turn, until Euthyphro abruptly ends the conversation in frustration. Socrates’s criticisms imply that he thinks the nature of piety is universal, unchanging, independent of the gods’ desires, and knowable—but not easily discovered.

Euthyphro suggests that piety is punishing people who have done wrong, but Socrates argues that this example doesn’t say anything more universal about piety that would apply to other situations. Even though his family believes otherwise, Euthyphro is convinced that he is acting piously by prosecuting his father, because the gods have done similar things. Euthyphro argues that Zeus bound his father Cronus for swallowing his children, and Cronus also castrated his own father Uranus for “similar reasons.” Socrates argues that this merely offers an example of a pious action. He’s not looking for an example, but a universal definition of piety that will let him pick out all pious actions, no matter what the scenario. In response, Euthyphro suggests that piety is what matters to the gods, and impiety is what does not. However, Socrates argues that the gods often disagree, so an action that pleases one god but irks another isn’t definitively pious.  Since the gods don't always agree, it's quite likely that Euthyphro’s decision to prosecute his father can be both pious (because Zeus is pleased) and impious (because Cronus and Uranus are displeased) at the same time. It won't do for something to be pious to one god (or person) but not to another because Socrates is looking for the unchanging essence of piety.

Euthyphro then suggests that piety isn’t just what some gods value, but what “all the gods love.” So, impiety is what is “all the gods hate.” Socrates argues that this still fails to show what piety is because knowing that something is loved by the gods doesn’t explain what that thing is. Instead, he convinces Euthyphro that being “god-loved” is merely something all pious things have in common. Socrates poses a dilemma: is something pious because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious? He argues it seems strange to say that the act of loving something “changes” it into something pious, even if that love is emanating from a god. A similar dilemma might be something like: is something beautiful because a person finds it attractive, or does the person find it attractive because it’s beautiful? Socrates thinks it seems strange to say that finding something attractive changes it from something ugly into something beautiful. Similarly, he thinks it's odd to say that something becomes pious just because it is loved. So it must be the case, Socrates argues, that the gods love something because it already is pious. In other words, the gods detect piety in that thing, and that’s why they love it. Socrates therefore contends that Euthyphro is confusing “an affect or quality” of pious things with the thing that elicits the response of being “god-loved.” In characterizing the feelings of the gods as mere responses to piety, Socrates is claiming that the nature of piety is constant and true, independent of any being’s feelings about it.

Euthyphro’s fourth and fifth definitions hinge on notions of caring for, or servicing, the gods. Socrates argues that both of these ideas require knowledge that is inaccessible to humans, namely knowledge of the gods’ intentions and desires. What he seeks, in contrast, is a definition of piety that is knowable. Socrates and Euthyphro agree that since humans are not in control of the gods, “caring” for the gods is not the same as “caring” for animals, or plants, or things that humans are in control of. Euthyphro suggests that caring for the gods is more like the kind of care slaves have for their masters. Socrates contends that slaves are able provide this sort of “care” by servicing their masters’ specific aims (such as winning wars, or growing crops). So Euthyphro suggests that the gods’ aims or desires are met by praying and offering sacrifices. He offers these actions as his fifth definition of piety. Socrates argues that praying is really more like begging the gods, but sacrifices are gifts offered to the gods. But this is hardly a fair trade, as humans don’t know what gifts the gods want. Euthyphro becomes frustrated because he cannot claim to know what ineffable things the gods need or desire. Once again, Socrates distances his idea of piety from the desires of the gods since these are unknowable.

In peppering Euthyphro with questions about the nature of piety, Socrates—and, by extension, Plato—steers the reader away from a definition that relies on the changeable and ineffable desires of the gods (or on anybody else's, for that matter), and towards one that is universal, unchanging, and discoverable through meticulous rational inquiry. This view of piety aligns with Plato’s theory of forms, which is more fully realized in later dialogues such as Phaedo and the Republic.